Discussing the city, citizenship, and the responsibilities of citizens without reviewing the processes that have led the world to its current state does not yield meaningful insights. Unless we assume that we can understand the world merely by following forms and imitations, we must begin our discourse on civic responsibilities with the emergence of a “new world” and what has been termed “industrial and political modernity.”
Technological Revolution and Political Revolution
Since the nineteenth century, when centers of commercial colonialism entered the processes of technological industrial revolution and the political revolution of nation-states, there has been little concern regarding the fate and calamities that these new and profitable institutions (markets, property, economic exchanges, centralized political systems) would bring upon their peoples and others around the globe. It is essential to remember that the calamity that befell the so-called Third World was entirely foreseeable. This was the same calamity that Europe had inflicted upon its own people in the filthy, overcrowded cities filled with disease and poverty, and during the grueling sixteen-hour workdays in the polluted factories of the nineteenth century.
However, the cultural transfer of the Eurocentric model, which predominantly took a commercial and authoritarian form from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, transformed into a technological-political form in the subsequent two centuries. This transfer occurred through authoritarianism once again, but this time by states that did not see their imperial nature as contradictory to their democratic aspirations. Within less than a century, the world was reduced from thousands of cultural, economic, political, and social realms through a horrific and violent process marked by millions of deaths, displacements, impoverishment, chaos, and deprivation affecting billions of people to approximately 200 “nation-states.” These states were expected to replicate the European model of legitimacy derived “from above” to “below,” becoming Europe’s new gift to the world, alongside the United States.
The “democratic state,” at least in its superficial form, thus spread across the globe. More significantly, it manifested in an ecological (urban) and temporal (everyday life) context as structures possessing internal rationality and self-generative qualities. The outcome was clear: the emergence of third-world states and cities represented external structures that could never establish an internal logic. Instead of improving their citizens’ conditions, they exacerbated poverty, corruption, violence, suffering, and anguish even in the long term. However, what is often discussed alongside third-world states and their backwardness rarely addresses the third side of this triangle: the people of the third world. This is seldom acknowledged except by colonialist intellectuals (such as Naipaul in England or Glucksmann in France), who place all the woes of these countries squarely on their shoulders and those of their populations. This perspective is not only unjust but also devoid of common sense and historical evidence.
The Paradoxical Issue of the National State Model
The paradoxical issue lies in the fact that the model of the national state, which requires two dimensions—top (government) and bottom (people)—along with a middle dimension, namely the spatial-temporal aspect (everyday city), forms a whole. The failure to comprehend this model and the absence of a culture capable of interlinking its components through rational connections and interactions, civility, and reciprocal relationships has consistently led to an incomplete interpretation. This issue has been particularly exacerbated in regions with a historical background of ancient states, such as our country. The reason for this is that there has been a continuous identification between what constituted the ancient state—of which only symbols and a limited set of capabilities and material remnants remain—and what a modern state should be in these countries. This identification has resulted in both government officials and citizens developing an irrational relationship with each other, as well as with state structures and mechanisms.
In our country, over the past century of efforts to establish a national state, and through the two major revolutions experienced during this time, the outcome has been no different. This painful experience remains incompletely understood and internalized, failing to yield practical and generalizable solutions. Other efforts, whether economic, technological, political, or educational approaches, will undoubtedly not lead to results on their own. In other words, the horizon of a region like ours has been and continues to be mired in a prolonged state of anomie. Occasionally—during periods of increased oil revenues and the influx of illicit funds into society—individuals temporarily forget their problems through heightened material consumption, remaining oblivious to the fundamental and structural blows inflicted on their existential systems, including nature, climate, individual and collective value systems, ethics, customs, and even religion and other belief systems.
Thus, over the past half-century, our cities have transformed into nearly uninhabitable dystopias that are polluted and harmful; our governments have become increasingly inflexible, decayed from within, and irresponsible; and our citizens find themselves on a steep decline in moral and ethical values. The pressing question now is how to relate the three sides of this triangle according to social rationality and based on global experiences in the emergence of modern cities and states. How can we balance these relationships to mitigate the destructive trend that is rapidly accelerating and gradually reverse it?
In discussions we have had on this topic (including referring to Mohsen Rannani’s project within a program titled “Development Dynamics,” which conducts research processes in the field of development and its theories while providing valuable summaries of various theories), we have repeatedly contemplated and analyzed each side of this triangle—namely the government-nation relationship and urban relations. The people’s side—or rather, the civil responsibility of the populace—is equally as important as the other two sides. However, we must acknowledge that despite the clear need for a holistic analysis and the structural interdependence of each side of this triangle with the other two, we have no choice but to occasionally emphasize one side to understand and progress toward identifying practical solutions. The civil responsibility of the people is the aspect I wish to focus on here.
Rousseau’s Social Contract for a Small City State
When Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote his general plan for a modern state in the “Social Contract” during the eighteenth century, the ideal government for him was a small city-state, which he saw exemplified in his contemporary city of Geneva. Thus, to discuss the previous triangle, the most significant point in Rousseau’s theory is that we are faced with an equilateral triangle (with three equal sides). In this triangle, the government is situated within the spatio-temporal context of a small city and its citizens. This stands in stark contrast to what later evolved, giving rise to increasingly bizarre triangles, especially in the Third World: very large governments with small territories (such as imperial and colonial systems) or, conversely, vast populations spread across large territories governed by small yet authoritarian states that derive their power not from their people but from their repressive and militaristic policies (as seen in Russia, China, and Brazil). There are numerous examples in this regard, but our focus here is on Iran.
Iran’s Experience with the Constitutional Revolution and the Islamic Revolution
Therefore, we return to the experience of two democratic revolutions in this country and their outcomes, which have left us with a relatively large territory—characterized by a significant dimension in the spatial-temporal context—where there exists neither a large population enjoying a high level of civility nor a government capable of meeting the needs and expectations of its people. In this context, one of the processes that we might consider is the establishment of positive cycles instead of the negative cycles that have been ongoing for years, continually exacerbating tensions and crises within this triangle. One such positive cycle could be civil responsibility as a strategy for urban development in modern times, which may ultimately lead to a rational, accountable government that is empathetic and aligned with its people.
Let’s frame our discussion with a few pathological questions that engage many profound thinkers: Can we hope to establish a suitable third side of the triangle—a healthy, constructive, and accountable government—without having the two other sides? Specifically, without a spatial-temporal urban context that does not function merely as an ideal city but at least as a dystopia on one hand, and on the other hand, without a populace that corrects its behaviors by drawing from its historical, customary, and religious past, as well as from similar situations in both developing and developed countries? Reversing this equation is not necessarily the best answer to the question.
This line of reasoning leads us toward utopian approaches based on radical thinking—approaches that over the past two centuries have often deemed the exercise of revolutionary power as the best means for altering relationships and social structures across various domains. However, the outcomes today almost everywhere indicate that this radicalism has either failed to yield results or has resulted in totalitarian, fragile, and corrupt systems, as seen in Russia, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Some of these systems, such as Germany and Japan, were later corrected at a tremendous human cost, while others remain fragile and unstable despite having paid a similarly heavy price.
Another conclusion is that if this radical mechanism were to yield results (as seen in the French and American Revolutions), it would only be in the long term. This raises the legitimate question of how far we can consider a system that takes over one hundred to one hundred fifty years to realize its foundational slogans (in both aforementioned cases) as a product of revolutionary imagination and utopia rather than the result of continuous struggles, reforms, and gradual cycles that brought it into existence. This is despite the fact that in its symbolic forms it may have preserved and sanctified the revolutionary myth (as in France). Should we not regard the major revolutions of the nineteenth century—models for all subsequent revolutions—that consistently advocate maximalist demands and the necessity for radical, comprehensive changes as mere futile and mythical utopian fantasies? We believe this response appears more rational because it can be theoretically articulated and aligns with historical evidence.
However, there is an even more significant point that we must all recognize: today, compared to twenty, thirty, or fifty years ago, the world has created such complex structures that radical revolutionary utopias seem almost impossible. This does not mean that utopian rebellions are impossible; however, these rebellions, which generally find their roots in despair and subsequent passivity within the same society, carry a much greater potential for manipulation. They can lead to outcomes that are entirely different from what they initially sought.
The Arab Spring and Its Consequences
The example of the “Arab Spring,” which the author of these lines warned about from the very first days regarding the existing radical illusions and its dark prospects (refer to the article titled “Which Arab Spring?” in the Iranian press and online / Special Issue of Shargh, October 8, 2011), is quite illustrative in this regard. In almost none of the countries that entered this process did the situation improve several years later; rather, we faced destruction and a regression of several years in history.
Therefore, it is advisable to realistically consider a few points for overcoming the crisis.
۱. As long as a sense of identity and belonging to time and place does not emerge among our citizens—meaning they do not feel a connection to this land and do not envision their futures within it (rather than in illusory migrations) and, most importantly, are not prepared to pay the potentially heavy price for these visions—one should not expect an improved situation.
۲. The improvement of life and its conditions depends much more on small-scale, everyday actions, voluntary behaviors, civil initiatives, and the elevation of civility among individuals in a society than one might assume. Therefore, the activities that our youth are currently engaged in across the country—ranging from environmental advocacy to cultural, social, and civic interventions—hold the highest potential for improving the overall system in the near or distant future. In contrast, radical criticisms of the government and political systems, based on the illusion that they can necessarily bring about change, have minimal impact.
۳. Violence and radicalism, in any form—whether verbal or behavioral—under any circumstances and by anyone within this sphere will result only in the gradual or sudden destruction of the entire system and all democratic achievements, potentially leading to foreign intervention and decades-long or years-long setbacks, as seen in recent Middle Eastern examples like Afghanistan and Iraq. Violent discourses are the most dangerous discourses. The best guarantee for preserving and improving the system, even if slowly, lies in increasingly adhering to and engaging with the world while aligning with its established processes.
The Responsibility of Intellectuals
In this process, our responsibility as intellectuals, in its broadest sense (both academic and non-academic), is fully engaged. Understanding the very complex conditions in today’s world and aligning with them is not a simple task. There is undoubtedly a need for specialists in various fields of the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences to collaboratively offer practical solutions that are free from violence, radicalism, and populism. Unfortunately, what we have witnessed in recent years is the dominance of radical populist discourses, exaggerated and superficial nationalisms, and a lack of understanding of the world. Worse still is a form of cultural lumpenism that has become prevalent in circles that should maintain significant distance from such relationships, approaches, and rhetoric. When we cannot adopt moderation in our speech and reasoning and distance ourselves from violence against our ideological opponents, we will undoubtedly be least prepared to understand the complexities of the current world. Therefore, such behaviors—unless consciously aimed at public destruction—certainly indicate complete irresponsibility among those who express them. Defending rights is a duty of society; civil responsibilities and activities should adopt minimalist rather than maximalist approaches. We believe that these are the most rational strategies in the current global and Iranian context.
This is an AI generated translation from Persian into English
Ettemad Newspaper, July 20, 2019
