Radicalism – Extremism or Moderation – Rationality in Times of General Crisis A Fundamental Question Confronting an Endless Dichotomy

by Nasser Fakouhi

In the extremely difficult circumstances currently facing our country—including a dire economic situation, widespread corruption, internal divisions among officials, the absence of a clear governance strategy, pressing social issues, mounting societal pressures, tensions and instability both within the population and between the people and the state, global threats, the devastating aftermath of the recent 12-day war and the looming danger of further conflict and destruction, international sanctions, and the profound injustices we witness on the global stage—a recurring question is on everyone’s lips: What is to be done?
This question is not new; for years, people have asked it of one another, rarely finding answers capable of convincing others. But perhaps a more critical question is this: What should those in power—decision-makers, administrators, and leaders at all levels—do? What follows is an attempt to respond to this question, not in the form of a list of solutions—which have been discussed in numerous previous articles—but as an analytical paradigm offering a broader framework for reflection. Our claim here is not that this response is more insightful, effective, or superior to the answers offered by others—or even to those we ourselves have previously proposed. The only distinction lies in our attempt to frame the response within a paradigmatic analysis.
In our view, neither the provision of practical solutions nor excessive warnings and advice can untangle the fundamental knots of our crisis unless there is a deep transformation in the dominant paradigms of governance. We are also fully aware that the pressing need to overcome passivity and the lack of vision does not concern only those in positions of power; the people, too, must engage to the extent that they can. However, by all logical standards, ordinary citizens—lacking access to decision-making levers at key junctures—possess significantly less capacity for action compared to those who hold such positions, in whatever form. People’s agency is largely limited to their everyday lives, and even that is constrained when a crisis reaches the level it has today.
Thus, in these harsh circumstances and under the pressure weighing down on the population from every direction, pointing fingers at the public and expecting them to resolve deep systemic issues—while ignoring the root causes embedded in the blind spots of governance—seems to me not only irrational but also ethically indefensible. In order to articulate what we believe to be the most reasonable and effective actions that decision-makers could undertake in the current situation—to relatively improve conditions, serve the public good, alleviate people’s anxieties, and revive a sense of hope—we must emphasize a fundamental void. This void stems from the absence of a clear strategy and a pragmatic vision for social organization, a gap caused by years of neglect at the decision-making level.
Let us return to the binary we mentioned at the beginning of this essay: throughout modern history—and increasingly as we approach the present—the two approaches of radicalism and moderation, or rational pragmatism, have diverged more and more sharply. And it seems evident to most observers today that, given the global trajectory, this widening gap has largely favored the former—radicalism—even if, under a false narrative, it is claimed that the world is moving toward reason and moderation.

Consider this example: throughout the twentieth century, radical and revolutionary groups on one side, and violent military or terrorist groups on the other, often operated under the banner of left- or right-wing radicalism. They attempted to present utopian global visions to their populations and pointed to radical, revolutionary, and insurgent actions as the path toward those idealized futures. According to this line of reasoning, discourses, practices, and, in short, radical or moral strategies and tactics are assumed to lead us swiftly and reliably toward utopian goals—and even ensure the long-term sustainability of those utopias. This belief gave rise, particularly in the twentieth century, to the development and growth of transcendental ideologies that embraced mythical yet thoroughly earthly concepts such as “progress,” “nationalism,” “revolution,” “coup d’état,” “vanguard movements,” “political conspiracies,” “propaganda,” and even hardline behaviors like “repression” and “oppression,” all seen as necessary means to achieve a promised utopia.
Meanwhile, the second approach—moderation and rationality—rested primarily on a kind of essentialism, suggesting that certain inherent qualities or virtues would naturally eliminate immoral, violent, or unjust goals and replace them with ethical, noble, and humanistic ones. The assumption here was that if the declared goals and the actors pursuing them were morally sound and virtuous by nature, then the outcome would inevitably be the realization of utopian ideals. However, the failure of both groups is now evident after at least a century of historical experience. Military coup leaders, suppressors, and conspirators who believed they could drive everything forward through wealth and the force of military and police power—while they may have succeeded in silencing legitimate public demands through large-scale and bloody repression—know better than anyone how fragile their position has become.
On the other hand, yesterday’s revolutionaries are today, in nearly every case, found in the position of new oppressors and profiteers—often more ruthless than those they once fought against. Thus, radicalism, understood as the use of coercive methods, allegedly justified violence, shortcuts, haste, and the elimination of all obstacles through force, deceit, conspiracy, or corruption, has almost always ended in failure. The record of failed Third World dictatorships, as well as revolutionary and even anti-colonial movements that ultimately turned into repressive regimes and new servants of former colonial powers, serves as clear evidence—at least from our perspective—of the futility of both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary ideologies. Populism, whether from the right or the left, whether in the East or the West, whether mobilizing angry, radicalized masses or relying on elite-led moderation and rationality, has led to absolute failure and contributed directly to the crises facing today’s world.
Therefore, to respond logically to the question raised above, we can begin by adopting a realistic perspective on political systems and examining both their failed and relatively successful applications. It is precisely here that we encounter one of the most fundamental problems in our own country: the simultaneous assault on both rationality and radicalism, stemming from a deep-rooted mythologization of both the past and the future. This mythologization—marked by a self-perception as the center of the universe—entails numerous and heavy costs, the foremost of which is the inability or unwillingness to recognize the complex realities of the contemporary world.
A world that is increasingly moving beyond a universal narrative and entering a state of puliversaism and systemic complexity. To achieve this, our officials, decision-makers, and intellectual elites must increasingly step out of the bubbles they have constructed—bubbles shaped by a kind of imagination and “quasi-real” discourse. They must attain the courage, maturity, and rationality needed to face issues directly and to develop clear strategies and visions for their people. This is what we, drawing on the work of French anthropologist Maurice Godelier, refer to as the “idealized reality.”

The reality of the current world, despite all the fake alternatives, conspiracies, hypocrisies, infiltrations, and manipulated data, cannot be neutralized. According to the extensive testimonies and analyses of the most prominent independent experts in social and political sciences worldwide, what we witness today is not merely a series of small or large local and regional crises. Rather, on an unprecedented large scale, it is a complex set of conflicts, tensions, wars, political conspiracies, interventions, and organized—even if temporary—aggravations of intricate international and national geopolitical situations. The scale of these issues has not been seen since World War II. In many cases, such as in Trump’s America, Western Europe, Putin’s Russia, China, and India, the current conditions can be compared to the period between the two World Wars of the twentieth century (1918 to 1940).
The world is on the brink of major events whose scope, contrary to common belief, extends far beyond the Middle East or Southeast Asia. This is happening and continuing in a context where the leaders of the great global powers and their affiliates in the East and West are among the most incompetent, corrupt, and ruthless actors’ humanity has ever witnessed. The outcome is clear: these groups systematically prioritize “authoritarianism,” social Darwinism, hatred, and the polarization of their own societies, fostering animosity and conflict between these poles. Everywhere, they strive to portray democracy as ineffective and to present “technocratic authoritarianism” as its replacement.
This is a discussion we will return to, tracing its roots in contemporary political philosophy such as Curtis Yarvin, Nick Land, and the “Dark Enlightenment” or the Neo-Reactionary movement (NRx). These philosophers link Trump’s America and British neoliberalism to China’s authoritarian, technocratic, party-led neoliberal capitalism. We will explore this topic in detail in another article. For now, it suffices to say that the goal of this ideology is to promote tension, conflict, and polarization among cultures and ideological, racial, ethnic, and political groups, rather than fostering policies of synergy, reconciliation, growth in diversity, cooperation, and coexistence.
This situation has brought us to face an outright catastrophe today: the world stands on the edge of a dangerous precipice—not only an ecological disaster but also, alongside it and perhaps even before it, an oligarchic, populist neo-fascism politically, and a covert Cold War that could at any moment escalate into a hot war, potentially leading to the destruction or severe regression of all humanity. To provide a tangible example of this situation, we can observe social media networks, which have now engulfed everyone everywhere. A clear manifestation of this is seen in people worldwide, for whom the mobile phone has become almost an extension of their body and, in fact, their mind. Today, these networks have become a kind of habitat—comparable to the village in the agricultural revolution and the city in the industrial revolution—for social actors. Whether they like it or not, these actors have no choice but to continuously engage and participate increasingly in these networks as their primary mode of political and social interaction.
Here, the general status and image of the network can be considered an ideal-type (in Weberian terms) representation of society as a whole. Anyone—even those with the worst political and social backgrounds, without any legitimacy, and even with records that are bankrupt and unacceptable in every respect—is voicing opinions on platforms whose size, whether small or in the millions, has lost any meaningful significance. This is precisely why this realm has become a vast arena for all governments and centers of influence to pursue their politically motivated goals and short- and long-term interests. Today’s reality, shaped by the latest information technologies, has itself become highly manipulable. Thus, if benchmarks like “truth,” “evidence,” and “documents” held meaning and influence until just a few years ago, we now see these standards fading away.

A complex world, grappling with the most intricate issues and subjected to extensive manipulation by profit-driven private and state systems—deeply enchanted by the “efficiency” of authoritarianism in contrast to the “fragility” of democracy—requires the smartest, most ethical, most committed, and indeed most effective social actors to occupy positions of power. It is clear that this does not mean that the “most specialized” or “most technologically advanced” individuals should hold these decision-making roles, since expertise without ethics and justice has, in many cases, led to the current global crises. Rather, the utilization of such expertise must be guided by the most rational and ethical leaders.
What we have discussed points to a fact that should be obvious but remains largely incomprehensible to the majority of our officials and managers—and even to a significant portion of our non-governmental elites and people—who view Iran’s situation through an astonishing lens of “egocentrism.” Although this phenomenon is much stronger among radical factions, it would be mistaken to think that other political and social groups are immune to it. This phenomenon, which has a long history in cultural studies, we call “localism.” According to this, even when we have a physical presence in global arenas and institutions, our presence is neither real nor effective. By “world,” we mean both the external international arena and the internal world—the society in which we live.
Therefore, here too, as always, one could list the usual solutions that might help improve the situation (a list repeated hundreds of times and still voiced daily by many everywhere). However, as long as these fundamental paradigms in both official and unofficial approaches are not properly understood and do not transform into sustainable governance strategies—deeply internalized by officials, decision-makers, and consequently by the people—even if this happens gradually over time, any hope of reaching even a relatively stable utopia remains nothing but an illusion. So, I reiterate once more what we have repeated dozens, if not hundreds, of times: ensuring the basic needs of the people are met in one of the world’s wealthiest countries, and doing so in a manner worthy of its citizens; maximizing all social, political, media, and communication freedoms to the highest possible extent while minimizing pressures in these areas; and reducing tensions both externally with the world and internally within society through systematic avoidance of violent, provocative, extremist, and hollow radical discourses and behaviors—alongside a widespread and relentless fight against corruption and its countless branches embedded in our society.
These are paths that have been repeatedly pointed out, and in every sector, experts have proposed clear, actionable measures with evident and tangible impact and speed. However, none of these can succeed without a fundamental and essential will—a will that stem from belief in the paradigm we discussed earlier. Without this, progress is unlikely to be achieved.
In a final conclusion, it must be said that reducing the discussion to facing two clear and distinct absolutes—radicalism and extremism on one side, and rationality and ethics on the other—is not entirely incorrect in an abstract or linguistic sense. However, this simplification is highly misleading because it fails to capture the complexity that exists between these two poles. Consequently, the actions we observe resemble futile struggles or endless cycles, not because of disagreements over solutions, but due to a lack of belief in the urgent necessity to understand, accept, and internalize these new realities of complexity and multipolarity.

This article was published on October 20, 2025, on the website Asr Iran.

This is a machine-assisted translation. The original article by Nasser Fakouhi is available at the following address:

رادیکالیسم – تندروی یا اعتدال – عقلانیت در موقعیت بحران عمومی