Freedom, justice, and restoring hope to the people: The only way out of the postwar crisis in Iran

۱- Given the positive role played by the people during the twelve-day war (Iran and Israel) and their success in thwarting the enemies’ plans, what responsibility does the Iranian political system hold toward the public?

The political system in Iran (as in any other country) is not monolithic, and by “State” we do not refer solely to the elected government or administration. However, when we speak of political system in the way this question frames it—which is both important and timely—we must also clarify what we mean by “political». In other words, it is evident that many internal disagreements may exist within the system. Leaving aside the issue of “infiltrators” the profiteers of sanctions, and the so-called “appointed hardliners” the real discussion is about internal disputes within the political structure as defined by the upper and middle echelons of power in Iran. These should be resolved internally through mechanisms that, from the outside, we have little influence over. Only through this resolution can a coherent or relatively unified approach emerge—one that clearly defines the system’s responsibilities both toward the people and toward the country’s future, especially considering ongoing and possibly escalating threats. To elaborate: if Iran were a country where political, social, and especially civil power were widely distributed with strong safeguards for dissent and critical scrutiny of authority, then your question might not even arise. But unfortunately, we are faced on the one hand with an immense concentration of communicative power (through filtering, media monopolization, slow internet, surveillance, political pressure, and a restricted public sphere), and on the other hand, with an extremely unregulated dominance of power in shaping access—whether to the economy, to information, or to the right of expression and its legal protection. For example, we observe a group of individuals and media outlets that can freely express whatever they wish without facing any consequences, while others come under immense pressure for even the mildest criticism. In such a situation, we are confronted with what can be described as an anomic state within the political structure itself—where even the boundaries of “red lines” are unclear and undefined. Ambiguity, and the dominance of appearances over substance, have become a scourge for both the public and the ruling authorities in Iran. The adversary sought out highly classified targets to strike, and apparently succeeded—either through infiltrators or intelligence operations—while many institutions that were supposed to safeguard the nation’s confidential matters were instead focused on monitoring whether women were being recorded by surveillance cameras while driving, and sending them warning text messages. The issue of infiltration and the damages it has caused to the country is something we have warned about for years. Excessive control, censorship, the lack or absence of political openness, media monopolization, deliberate extremism, restricted internet access coupled with the proliferation of VPNs, harsh interference in private lives, and the entanglement of security forces—whose primary role should be to maintain public order—in the minutiae of citizens’ daily affairs: all of these have opened the gates to external infiltration. And this is exactly what happened. Even if it were claimed that a country like Iran—located in a highly sensitive and volatile region—could simultaneously exercise both extreme levels of security precision in monitoring trivial and private aspects of daily life, and exert unprecedented (and globally unmatched) control over its citizens’ personal affairs, while also effectively managing critical state security and external threats, the problem would still not be resolved. This is because data related to everyday life has now itself become a tool for espionage agencies.
In other words, surveillance footage—even that aimed at monitoring dress codes—can be hacked through networks and analyzed by artificial intelligence, exposing highly confidential and top-secret national information. If this data falls into the hands of adversaries, it could cause irreparable harm. Therefore, the course of action for the ruling system should be clear: just as most citizens temporarily reconciled with one another and acted civilly, the state too must do the same. This means both de-escalating internal conflicts within the power structure and avoiding hostile rhetoric or action against one another. More importantly, they must heed—after countless warnings—the critical point that if the majority, or even a significant portion, of a nation’s population does not stand behind its government (beyond factional lines), then even the world’s most advanced weapons and armies cannot defend it against its enemies.
A rift between the state and its people—especially when some groups are humiliated by others—creates an open gateway for infiltration at all levels, potentially handing over strategic intelligence to adversaries. Worse still, it sends a green light to those enemies, signaling that they face a state abandoned by its people and thus free to act without resistance. Your answer is simple: the ruling establishment must reach an internal consensus—one that ultimately serves the people—and respond, at least partially, to their demands. These demands today include: ensuring minimum social welfare, public safety, the release of all prisoners of conscience, abolition of the death penalty, comprehensive revision of national laws toward greater individual freedoms, non-interference by the state in citizens’ private lives and lifestyle choices (while maintaining civil decorum as practiced in many other Islamic countries), a more open political environment, an end to information monopolies, the lifting of internet filtering, and access to fast, affordable, and unrestricted internet—among other urgent public concerns. If these reforms are implemented, perhaps that infiltration efforts will lose their effectiveness, and political extremism and calls for war will rapidly subside. Because it will then be evident that such radical actions do nothing but serve the interests of the country’s adversaries.

۲ – What issues should officials prioritize in order to pay attention to the people and gain public trust and support?

As mentioned earlier, the key demands are clear, but perhaps they should also be prioritized step by step. First and foremost is the need to end interference in people’s lifestyles and private spheres—an issue that has caused the greatest public dissatisfaction in recent years and, in many cases, has actively generated hostility toward the state. Why do officials react so strongly, even with security measures, against joy, celebration, or simple expressions of happiness—people laughing, gathering, or holding festivals? Doesn’t this create public resentment and provide ammunition for hostile narratives? Doesn’t it give adversarial states excuses to interfere and fuel their public opinion against Iran’s internal situation?
The second priority is the liberalization of information dissemination and the creation of an open political space for discussion and addressing problems. The monopoly on radio and television broadcasting—which today has effectively shifted to the internet environment—must be abolished. Full, free, affordable, and high-speed internet access is the second major priority. The return of political prisoners to their families and the elimination of intensive surveillance and security interference in people’s private lives—which data, whether willingly or unwillingly, are immediately exploited by intelligence agencies—is another crucial priority. The freedom of political prisoners, along with the right to protest and demonstration, all enshrined in the constitution, are demands that, if implemented, will ensure that neither Europe nor the United States can continue sanctions, whether through negotiation or otherwise, and Iran’s economic situation will improve. Likewise, accepting all their conditions in negotiations on nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, in my view, will achieve nothing if it is not accompanied by the measures of opening the country’s political space and bridging the gap between the government and the people. Our economic problems stem from corruption and infiltration, and if these issues are addressed, solutions will be achieved much faster than anticipated. My point is that political extremism—often contrary to the views of even the highest officials in the country—and the creation of hostility among our own people, which provides pretexts to foreign enemies on one hand, and the radical slogans of overthrow voiced by groups willing to ally with enemies who bomb Iran under their banners, are two sides of the same coin.
In today’s world, there is no doubt that we must be strong—and very strong—but power does not lie solely in weapons (or at least not only in weapons); rather, it is far more rooted in democratic support. The internal enemies—whether infiltrators or not—have, over decades, exerted the greatest pressure to drive a wedge between officials and the people, inciting individuals to chant the most extreme and often completely unfeasible political slogans. Why? It is clear: to provide justification for these attacks. Meanwhile, there have been allies who have consistently supported peace and calm, opposed violence and division among the people, and resisted applying pressure on them.

۳ – Economic problems are considered the primary concern and demand of the people. How can the government effectively inform the public about economic realities to prevent misjudgments about its performance?

The economic problems in Iran are not truly economic in nature. Iran is not a poor country lacking efficient economic and managerial human resources, nor is it devoid of rich natural resources and/or significant energy assets. The issue lies in the underutilization of strong economic and managerial forces under the pretext that they are not “revolutionary” or not “political committed”. The question is: what revolution or commitment is greater than defending the country? Our people have shown that even under the worst conditions of sanctions and external pressure, resisting attempts to sow discord and internal unrest through political, ethnic, and other divisions, they have stood united and supported the government. This unity has been a primary reason for the enemy’s retreat, alongside military and geopolitical factors. Therefore, in my view, if the people’s demands are met or at least serious steps are taken toward fulfilling them—so that people regain hope for the future—even if it takes several years to fully achieve these goals, as long as the process is genuine and not superficial or temporary, there is no doubt that Iran can quickly move toward lifting sanctions, freeing its vast assets abroad, increasing economic resources, and attracting both healthy international and domestic investment, thereby solving these problems to a large extent.
Iran is one of the potentially wealthiest countries in the world, especially in a global context where Asia is emerging as the dominant power of the 21st century. However, if one assumes that an authoritarian model like China’s—based on heavy militarization or even nuclear weapons—could lead a country like Iran, with its unique culture and circumstances, to economic success, this indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of both China’s ancient and current cultural, demographic, ethnic, and social complexities and those of Iran.
Our country was the first in the region to raise the flag of constitutionalism and democracy a century ago (1906 Constitutional Revolution). Throughout this period, major powers have consistently obstructed Iran’s progress toward freedom, justice, and democracy because these ideals conflicted with their interests, often relying on internal collaborators to maintain control. Therefore, the path to better economic standing is not through technological shortcuts or unfounded neoliberal theories—neoliberalism here is distinct from liberalism, which can foster a human- and society-centered economy—but rather through a return to the people. Neglecting these issues and postponing action risks exacerbating the dangers for a country like ours in future critical moments. The current economic model is based on dismantling the middle class, and history offers no example of such an approach leading to anything but complete national devastation.

۴ – Could the political system’s potential neglect of the people increase the cost of confrontation with the enemies?

Without a doubt. Not only for us but for the entire region and country. We must be careful because today, for many reasons that cannot be fully discussed here, aside from a group of ultra-Orthodox Jews, a group of peace supporters, and most of the Europeans and American Jews most the Israel’s population supports the idea of a “Greater Israel” stretching from the Euphrates to the Nile. In recent days and months, we have seen how Netanyahu, who represents this group, is expanding the scope of the war not only toward Iran but also creating tensions with Egypt, Syria, and Turkey — even countries that recognize Israel.
However, his mistake lies in underestimating the strength of Iranian culture and the immense value of Iranian diversity. He has presumed that thousands of years of culture mean nothing to all our people. For this reason, the plan that Israel has been working on for more than a decade — to simultaneously launch a “blitzkrieg” war and incite internal chaos along with military attacks by paramilitary groups from three tense borders, turning Iran into a zone like Syria — has failed. This is without because measures should also be taken to strengthen Iran’s military forces and increase vigilance in this regard. While Iran’s primary stance should always be negotiation and avoiding military confrontation, one should also emphasizes that Iran’s long-term policy—regardless of who is in power—must be based on independence from both the West and the East in their political meanings and on establishing itself as a key regional power. However, this cannot be achieved without relying on the people, creating social peace, accepting cultural diversity, and differing opinions among them, respecting beliefs, and controlling and sidelining political extremists who undoubtedly bear heavy responsibility for the country’s current problems and try, as always, to shift this responsibility onto the current reformist government, which lacks necessary authority. Making extreme and provocative slogans, spreading controversial tweets—such as one recently featured on the front pages of all Israeli newspapers—and voicing warmongering analyses, in my view, clearly plays into the enemy’s hands. Iran is not currently in a position of weakness and can enter negotiations powerfully and without rushing, because the way out of this crisis—as with all previous ones—is not, as the hardliners say, more strictness, more executions and imprisonments, increased information monopolies, further restricting access to information, and greater pressure on a people who must fear even their laughter, joy, and gatherings for everyday celebrations. Rather, the path forward is quite the opposite.

Let us pause and consider which of these two approaches has helped Iran’s external enemies more over all these years. A clear answer to this question will clarify many issues.

This interview was conducted with the website “Asr Iran” on July 20, 2025. Interviewer: Elnaz Cheraghi

“This is an AI-generated translation of an article originally available at:

تنها راه برون‌رفت از بحران، آزادی و عدالت و امید بخشیدن به مردم است

Accessed on 26/06/2025.”