A Critical Analysis of Today’s Society: An Interview with Naser Fakouhi / Part One

I met Nasser Fakouhi at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Tehran, in his office. I first came to this faculty ten years ago as a student, but I never had the chance to be one of his pupils. This time, however, I sat down for nearly two hours to listen to his reflections on the current state of Iranian society — a conversation that was no less enriching than a two-hour academic lecture. Fakouhi is a professor at the University of Tehran and the director of the Institute of Anthropology and Culture. His office is filled with books on sociology, anthropology, culture, and various other fields. The window overlooks the courtyard, and in one corner sits a computer where he had been working before the interview began. As we started talking, he moved to a round table, cluttered with books, and I took a seat across from him.

Dr. Fakouhi considers himself a diagnostician of society—someone who has maintained his connection with the public as much as possible and has consistently sought to address social problems through writing, critique, and the use of media. He believes that this approach and public presence have been accompanied by numerous and frequent “accusations,” “claims,” and “pseudo-critiques” from a wide range of individuals with various perspectives. Fakouhi deliberately chooses not to respond to them, as doing so, in his words, “would require shifting his academic field from the social sciences to psychology.” Nevertheless, he believes he understands the roots of such reactions and states: “These are actors and processes that dislike having a mirror held up to them—disliking when their wounds and dysfunctions are laid bare. Among them are academics who believe the profession of social science should be confined to closed offices and unread ‘scientific’ journals, with no engagement in the real spheres of their own society. Alongside them stand others who may seem quite different but are, in fact, strikingly similar: the ‘self-proclaimed intellectuals’ who have adopted the street-level language of lumpenism as their own. For them, the risk-free arenas of anonymous website comments, newspaper columns, or so-called intellectual gatherings have become platforms to showcase their talent for insult and slander. They project their own dysfunctions onto all intellectuals and academics, falsely associating themselves with honorable figures to whom they bear no real resemblance.” The thinkers of this country—both among academics and intellectuals—have been countless from past to present, and they are all known by their work; it is evident that such critiques are not directed at them,” Fakouhi clarifies. In his view, all of these societal dysfunctions stem from a deeper, more fundamental issue: the rise of nouveau-riche mentalities and the monetization of most processes, behaviors, and values, leading to a shift toward neoliberalism and a new form of economic and cultural parvenuism that is eroding the foundations of Iranian society.

He sees this trend as a growing force that brazenly defends capitalism in its most predatory form—late-stage American capitalism—and simultaneously attempts to silence its critics (not opponents of fair markets or exchange, but critics of savage capitalism) with baseless accusations. Yet, even those who present themselves as “anti-capitalists,” while relying on this very cultural and intellectual parvenuism, fall into hollow delusions that ultimately strip their critique of any meaningful foundation.
Fakouhi believes that the destruction of Iran’s institutional structures is currently being carried out by profiteers and cultural and economic nouveaux riches. According to him, their corrosive influence has deeply affected key systems such as media, higher education, public education, and healthcare, leaving clear marks in the form of pathological social behaviors.

These manifestations range from the spread of lumpenism, reckless insult and defamation in public discourse, and the buying and selling of academic degrees, to racist delusions, baseless economic claims, and even deeply unethical financial exchanges—such as the trafficking of human organs.
In his view, women’s issues, consumerism, and the widespread rise of nouveau riche behavior among social actors are among the most fundamental challenges facing Iranian society today. These major issues give rise to a host of more specific problems, such as environmental pollution and degradation, the quantification of academic work, and the decline of scientific and ethical standards across institutions.

To what extent do you see Iran’s rapid societal changes as emerging from within the people themselves?

All societies go through constant change at different points in time. In fact, culture and social systems cannot survive without change. Sometimes this change is slow, sometimes fast. The pace and nature of transformation depends on the specific stage the society is in, the events occurring within it, and the external contexts surrounding it. So speaking broadly about a country like Iran, with a population of 80 million, and situated in a highly dynamic region like the Middle East, where numerous developments are unfolding, is not a simple task.
We must clarify what kind of change we are referring to, and which people we are speaking about. In the media and in public discourse, the term “people” often refers vaguely to public opinion or the majority population. But if we want to be more precise, the word “people” is not analytically meaningful, because such a level of social cohesion doesn’t actually exist. Social groups do not experience change at the same rate, and they are not fully aligned with each other.

Sometimes the changes that occur in a society are top-down, but here I’m referring to bottom-up changes. Social groups, despite their diversity and internal differences, have a real impact on society. It appears that the pace of change currently unfolding in Iranian society is so rapid that the state often lags behind social developments, and at times is caught off guard or surprised by them. This suggests that there is, at times, a disconnect between the upper and lower levels of society—a kind of lack of awareness or understanding of social realities by those in positions of power.

What we call the state or government are systems primarily understood as having the capability to organize within systematic frameworks and regulatory processes. These systems are not necessarily consciously aware internally and operate based on a set of complex processes.

The actors within these systems, whether consciously or unconsciously, generally act according to ideological frameworks and pursue specific goals—whether here or anywhere else in the world—such as how to better govern society, how to steer it in a particular direction, or how to prevent it from moving in a certain way.
If we extend global experience in developed and developing countries to historical systems, it is almost always the case that the actors within government systems lag behind the people in terms of mindset and actions. This is a reality that is often overlooked: political actors reflect society, not the other way around. It is not the state that creates the social system; rather, the social system creates the state. The political system, because of its internal rules and especially its immediate power to influence, falls into the illusion that it is ahead of society.
This is the source of many tensions between social systems and what is called “top” and “bottom”; that is, what we observe at the top is not necessarily the same as what we observe at the bottom, and there is no coordination between them. Social systems are primarily formed at the bottom or at the macro-social level, not at the top. However, political systems, which are at the top, always harbor the illusion that, since they politically and powerfully dominate the society beneath them, they can do whatever they want with it. This is a biological and organic understanding, similar to the relationship between central organs in the body and peripheral organs, or like the kinship relationship between parents and children.
The hegemonic biological relationship—or domination-based relationship—is always illusory, and this illusion leads the central or upper system to think that it can do whatever it wants, assuming that the lower system fundamentally depends on decisions made above. However, historical experience and examples seen in all political and social systems do not support this view. What the examples show is that we are dealing with a complex network of communications and exchanges, whose elements mutually influence each other in various ways.
Even if we return to the biological level or recent family studies, it is no longer true that parents can do anything they want with their children. This thesis has also been rejected at the biological level: the brain’s will cannot do whatever it wants to the body, and it has become clear that peripheral organs also influence the body. Similarly, children also affect their parents. At the social level, the issues are far more complex, and this network is more active in its peripheral and non-central relationships than in its central ones. This relates to the theory of complexity proposed by a thinker like Edgar Morin. In complexity theory, we reach the idea that, in reality, there is no strict “top” and “bottom”; this notion of hierarchy is an abstraction often accompanied by reductionist processes or exaggerated simplifications of complex realities. We employ these processes to make complex external systems—and even more so, the “coincidences,” or what we perceive as coincidences, sudden shifts, and many other disruptions that our minds or bodies cannot fully understand or respond to—comprehensible to ourselves and actionable.
In a sense, the “people” are themselves the “state,” and the “state” is itself the “people,” and these are interconnected through numerous layers and relationships, both consciously and unconsciously. At the linguistic and cognitive level, since hierarchical categorizations have been made, people speak as if there is a government and a people existing in two separate places, each as independent and autonomous entities that can behave however they want with themselves and others and achieve whatever results they desire. However, the reality is not like this.

Still, we can talk about very specific examples of different social groups and the changes they make. We can discuss institutions, changes within those institutions, and influential interventions, which is a valid discussion. If we want to look at it from this perspective, we should examine which societies in what historical periods can be compared to Iranian society in terms of dynamism or lack thereof; how much change is occurring; in which direction these changes are moving; where these changes are most intense; and other related topics.
Iranian society, in a broad framework, has been evolving since about a hundred years ago—a period we call “Contemporary Iran” or “Modern Iran”—beginning in the 20th century. It is moving towards building multiple, distinct modernities rather than a single unified modernity. Consequently, this society has faced many ups and downs, encountering numerous opportunities and challenges along the way. Our greatest advantage has been that we did not start from zero. Iran is a system with a continuous linguistic, political, cultural, social, and economic continuum that has lasted for several thousand years, accumulating in various domains. If it utilizes these assets well, it can enter diverse modernities or a plural modernity far more successfully. At the same time, this background, as much as it is positive for us, can also have negative aspects. In other words, having a long-standing socio-cultural heritage can be like a paternal legacy that on one hand carries positive value, but on the other hand, if not properly managed, can become a burden. In my view, cultures like Iran’s must manage themselves with greater intelligence and strength. Over the past hundred years, we have largely succeeded in constructing this plural modernity. Iranian society has never been completely passive over the past century, and compared to many other societies, it has shown relatively less passivity; any passivity that existed was partial or sectional, and not representative of the society as a whole. Therefore, it is important to recognize that a society may appear passive on the surface but be undergoing change at a deeper level.
Perhaps in the past ten years, Iranian society has mostly been undergoing deep changes beneath the surface; however, what happens deep down eventually emerges and reveals itself. This society and its changes manifest themselves above all in its youthfulness, which impacts the society. This youthfulness is not only biological but also cultural.The issue of the diversity of lifestyles among these young people is also significant. They are unwilling to follow a single, defined lifestyle and insist on preserving their particular way of life, seeing their identity within it. Changing this is nearly impossible. For more than thirty years, there have been efforts to create and promote a specific cultural type and a particular lifestyle as the only possible form, but we have seen that this has not happened and never will. In fact, such uniformity is impossible and has not occurred in other societies either.
But another important point is the increase in cultural capital. Regardless of how negative our view may be of the academic or media environments, or how much we think they have shortcomings or deviations, this does not prevent the accumulation of cultural capital. Iran is a country that, thanks to its substantial economic revenues, has been able to establish a system for the distribution of knowledge and the expansion of cultural capital. It is a country with about five million students currently enrolled in universities and more than five million active agents who have graduated from the academic system. Today, almost all children of school age attend school. In such a society, certainly the accumulation of cultural capital is high, and this impacts changes and transformations. However, currently this cultural capital is not being adequately responded to, and the root of tension in our society lies in the fact that these changes do not receive the necessary responses, resulting in the creation and accumulation of negative energy that could potentially lead to explosions. Therefore, in Iran today, we are faced with a young society, diverse lifestyles, accumulated cultural capital, and also accumulated economic capital. The accumulation of financial capital has changed our society and its attitude towards work; the society has become highly monetized and commodified, which is entirely negative. Nonetheless, these various tendencies have prevented Iranian society from being a poor Third World country today. Iran cannot be compared to Pakistan or the poor countries of South America or Africa. Iranian society is comparable to countries with oil wealth. Iran is among the richest countries in the world, and if the society cannot manage itself properly, it will head towards the dominance of consumerist systems lacking economic rationality; phenomena like ostentation and nouveau riche behavior will grow. Economically, neoliberalism cannot find a better place than Iran to settle and begin its destructive operations—something that has already happened in other parts of the world. Another important issue is the role of women, which is fundamental. Since the revolution, women have played a key role in transforming Iranian society. In any society where the role of women changes, everything changes. Women are the foundation of social systems and educational structures. When they enter social spheres—historically and prehistorically male-dominated, with laws and norms built around male presence—those spheres begin to change. This applies to security and military systems, language and discourse, and the perspectives on various issues. A society moving towards greater female participation and “feminization” undergoes a complete transformation.
Another significant change in Iranian society over the past fifty years has been the shift from a predominantly rural population—around eighty percent—to an almost entirely urban one. Urban life is fundamentally different from rural and tribal lifestyles, especially considering that urbanization in Iran includes both densely and sparsely populated areas. This transformation is not merely geographical but also cultural, as people living in cities think and behave differently from those in villages. However, it is crucial to consider what responses these comprehensive changes have elicited. In my view, no adequate response has been provided. Whether before or after the revolution, the responses have only been at the minimal level required by social systems to react to these changes. Yet, these responses have been wholly disproportionate to the scale of the transformations, as every change inevitably generates new demands and expectations. If we consider the level of demands generated by social changes over the past thirty years, the responses provided have not even reached ten percent of what was required. Therefore, we witness a significant imbalance between the demands and the responses they receive. This gap creates a conflict that has remained unmanaged, and the management that has occurred is solely financial and monetary in nature—something I would not call true management. It resembles the medical practice of treating symptoms with morphine and cortisone. While cortisone and morphine suppress symptoms, they ultimately lead the body towards deterioration. This is exactly what has happened in Iran. The system does not wait for demands to be properly addressed; social systems are self-propelling and inevitably move toward seeking responses on their own.
Iranian women, who after the revolution widely entered university education, have limited employment opportunities, approximately twelve to thirteen percent. They cannot wait for society to decide when they should achieve job equality with men. Consequently, if women have been unable to enter the formal labor system, they have engaged in social spheres through art, literature, or volunteer work. In short, sometimes the path found by the social system is appropriate, sometimes inappropriate, and usually a combination of both; however, from a social perspective, this process is ultimately inadequate. This dangerous situation could persist, and since we are a wealthy country, such “monetary therapies” can continue for years. Yet, the process of social deterioration intensifies day by day.

This interview with Azadeh Shams was conducted within the framework of collaboration between Anthropology and Culture and ISNA News Agency, and was published on October 26, 2015.

This text is an AI-generated translation of the first part of an interview with Nasser Fakouhi. The original Persian text can be found at the following link:

آسیب‌شناسی جامعۀ امروز/ گفت‌وگو با ناصر فکوهی / بخش اول