The central question we aim to address here is the following: Why are revolutions representations of a utopian will (from eu, meaning “good,” and topos, meaning “place”), yet in practice—and almost invariably in their initial waves—they lead to dystopian conditions (from dys, meaning “bad,” and topos, meaning “place”)? In this context, what is the relationship between “revolutionary hope or expectation” and the “realization of revolutionary slogans”? Can revolution be regarded as a dispensable movement? Is it power and violence that ultimately bring revolutionary goals and ideals to fruition, or should these elements be considered as forms of “damage” incurred along the way toward their realization?
To address these questions, we will examine several key concepts and refer to a number of theorists—most of whom have been deliberately selected from outside the conventional domains of sociology and the social philosophy of revolution, such as Crane Brinton, Samuel Huntington, and even Hannah Arendt or Karl Popper. This approach is intended to offer new perspectives on the topic. In our view, these alternative insights are essential for understanding a general theory of revolution and grasping its complex mechanisms.
We begin by examining the concept of power as developed by Michel Foucault, particularly in his works Discipline and Punish and The Will to Knowledge. Foucault emphasizes the notion of bio-power as a distinctly modern phenomenon: the ability to harness, regulate, and modify life itself in order to reproduce power. This process is inherently reductive, as it necessitates the marginalization of non-normative forms of life and enforces both formal and substantive homogeneity within social organisms, thereby turning such uniformity into a normative rule.
According to Foucault, modern power is characterized by five key features:
۱. Power is not a “thing” that one possesses or loses; rather, it emanates simultaneously from countless points within the social system and through its unequal relationships.
۲. Power relations are not situated above, outside, or apart from other forms of relationships—such as economic, scientific, or sexual relations. Instead, these dimensions are deeply intertwined, and power operates through their imbrication.
۳. Power emerges from the most basic social units, such as the family, the factory, etc., and extends from these sites to permeate broader social relations, reproducing dynamics of domination and subordination.
۴. Power relations are intentional yet non-subjective. They are not the result of any specific individual or group’s desire for power, but rather arise from complex strategic programs that operate independently.
۵. Wherever there is power, there is also resistance—more precisely, a multiplicity of resistances. Resistance is not merely reactive but constitutes the negative counterpart to domination. Its strategic codification may render revolution possible (1).
Foucault concludes that the exercise of power is not primarily a relationship between substances or actors, but rather should be understood as the effect of an “action upon action.” In other words, before seeking the causes of power in psychological motivations or individual and social interests, we must first conceive of it as a mode of acting that generates other actions.
Here, we can draw the first conclusion regarding the theory of revolution: thinking of revolution as a driver of social change through the mere transformation of state political power is an illusion. This is because power is not concentrated at the top; rather, the apex of power is often merely a representation—sometimes purely symbolic—of the endless dispersion and ambiguity of power throughout the social system.
The second theorist to whom we must refer is the French structural anthropologist Françoise Héritier, a student of Claude Lévi-Strauss and former head of the Social Anthropology Laboratory at the Collège de France. In this reference, we focus on the concept of “change,” which is declared as the fundamental goal of every revolution:
In order for a social innovation to become possible, sometimes centuries are needed. First, the innovation must be logically possible; in other words, it must be comprehensible within the realm of ideas. Then, it must be thinkable within the system of thought—that is, people must be able to contemplate it, even if doing so invites ridicule or laughter from others. Finally, the innovation must be emotionally perceivable, meaning the majority of society can accustom themselves to it. Only under these conditions can such an innovation [at least potentially] be considered technologically realizable. (2)
Returning to the concept and theory of revolution, we must say that thinking of revolution as a “moment,” an “event,” or a “ritualistic occurrence” — typically framed as a ritual of overturning that creates change by turning things upside down — is a mythical and manipulative notion. Ultimately, such overturning may only be a method between two sides that are identical or can become identical; in other words, a return from the end to the beginning and vice versa, which is also reflected in the etymology of the word “revolution.”
The third theorist we refer to is the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, whose work in Of Grammatology (3) highlights several key concepts relevant here: first, logo-centrism (which we translate as “word-centrism,” although this term is somewhat inadequate), leading to phallocentrism (or “phallo-word-centrism”), then to the concept of the “metaphysics of presence,” and ultimately to deconstruction (deconstruction). The first term has roots in the philosophy of the German Ludwig Klages and the linguistics of the Swiss Ferdinand de Saussure, while the second has Lacanian origins and is conceptually Freudian, referring to the relationship between the symbolic father figure and power.
According to Derrida, Western systems of thought have always been fundamentally logocentric, meaning that they originate from a single center—namely, the “logos” or speech—which manifests itself in the meaning of presence (what he calls the metaphysics of presence). This center serves as a fixed point of reference within each system, though the exact center may vary depending on the system—God, the human subject, the unconscious, or something else.
Secondly, based on this center, binary oppositions arise, where each term defines and gains meaning through its relation to the opposite (what Lévi-Strauss refers to as binary systems in structuralism). Examples include presence/absence, essence/appearance, being/non-being, reality/illusion, man/woman. In all these binaries, the first term holds dominance, priority, and superiority over the second, being regarded as positive and authentic, while the second is considered negative and secondary. Centers and oppositions always aim to maintain the system’s coherence and continuity after its establishment.
Derrida’s concept of deconstruction is employed to analyze these systems by first identifying the centers and binary oppositions within each system, and then by dismantling the boundaries between these oppositions. Deconstruction reveals how these divisions are not fixed but can shift and change across different contexts.
The concept of Logos (meaning word, speech, reason, God, or meaning) originates from the Gospel of John, chapter 1, verse 1: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” Derrida combines this concept with phallogocentrism—a term rooted in Lacanian-Freudian thought—merging the ideas of absolute meaning and the primordial masculine father figure to analyze them in parallel. He demonstrates that the oppositional and logocentric idea is inevitable for the condition of social being, yet simultaneously, it is an idea shaped within a specific society and, to a great extent, inherently lacks stable meaning.
Here we arrive at the third reflection on the theory of revolution: in a revolution, there are not necessarily two opposing poles facing each other, and the victory of a revolution does not inevitably mean a structural rupture where one side establishes dominance over the other (an idea closely associated with Marxism). Rather, revolution might be understood as a continuous continuum, which at certain irregular moments follows a sinusoidal pattern of movement.
Moreover, revolutionary violence—and violence in general—does not necessarily correspond to the concept of power as understood by Foucault; violence is a voluntarist, logocentric phenomenon whose manifestation in the realm of action takes a phallogocentric form and, in the mental realm, appears as the metaphysics of presence. As Derrida states in his book The Truth in Painting: “In painting, we witness the absorption of space into sound, because logocentrism in painting is structured language itself.” (۴)
The equivalent of this in the theory of revolution can be understood as the absorption of the physical space of action into the metaphysical space of discourse—a space that manifests itself through the expression of presence. In other words, ultimately, what matters is not “what has happened,” but rather “what has been said.”
Here, we arrive at the utopian and dystopian theory, which can be translated both as “good place” and “bad place,” or alternatively as “non-place” and “place.” In other words, these two can be seen on one hand as a place/city/position/condition that does not exist and is therefore desirable and sought after, and on the other hand as a place/city/position/condition that exists and is thus undesirable and unwanted.
According to Foucault’s theory, the existence of resistance is understood simply by the existence of power; disobedience arises from the presence of command; oppositional dissatisfaction exists alongside dominant consent. In this context, utopia becomes a driving force carrying hope, whose content is resistance, while dystopia results from actions and mentalities that are inherently doomed to fail because they hold illusions about the possibility of change.
Let us conclude with two final questions: Do we still need utopia today, and are revolutions still possible?
In our view, both questions have positive answers. We need utopia because the continuation of life occurs within a dichotomous, oppositional relational framework with the environment. On one hand, this relation is subversive, where the “self” can only become itself through the mental and/or physical destruction, negation, and exclusion of the “other.” On the other hand, life is only possible through a relation of complementary dependence with the environment—a generative relation (libido)—in which the self can only regenerate itself by regenerating the other.
Thus, in our bio-cultural life cycle, we face the cycle of Eros and Thanatos: the drive of life and the drive of death; the cycle of femininity (pleasure, sowing, birth) and masculinity (pain, destruction, death). Utopia, therefore, is the engine of life, addressing the need for hope through libido as defined by Gilles Deleuze in his concept of “desire.”
But why are revolutions possible? Precisely because revolutions, beyond their social, psychological, political, economic, and cultural dimensions, emerge within a mechanism of power and the exercise of power that lies beyond human will. They occur through an endless chain of cascading effects of “action upon action,” based on Foucault’s theory.
In conclusion, to understand the phenomenon of revolution as a social process, a holistic approach is necessary—one that goes beyond the purely sociological perspective to include political, economic, and psychological dimensions. This requires connecting biology, sociology, and psychoanalysis—not in the sociobiological sense, but through concepts such as Foucault’s bio-power (bio-pouvoir) or Durkheim’s notion of habitus, further developed and theorized by Bourdieu.(5)
Here’s how you can present your references in an academic English format:
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References:
۱)Colas, D. (1992). La Pensée politique. Paris: Larousse, p. 752.
۲)Héritier, F. (2007, February 2-3). Interview. Le Monde.
۳)Derrida, J. (1967). De la Grammatologie. Paris: Minuit.
۴)Derrida, J. (1978). La Vérité de la Peinture. Paris: Flammarion.
۵)Bourdieu, P. (1979). La Distinction. Paris: Minuit.
Fakouhi, N. (2013, February 17). Lecture at the joint session of “Anthropology and Culture” and “Islamic Association of Students, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tehran,” Sunday, 29 Bahman 1391 (Feb 17, 2013).
Available at: http://anthropology.ir/node/9132
This lecture was delivered on Tuesday, 1 Esfand 1391 (Feb 20, 2013), at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tehran, and an excerpt was published in Shargh newspaper.
Available at: http://www.sharghdaily.ir/Default.aspx?NPN_Id=49&pageno=14
This text is an AI-generated translation of a Persian article originally published on the website of Dr. Nasser Fakouhi (nasserfakouhi.com). The original article is accessible at:
